INTRODUCTION
What is the influence of the Australian Constitution ('Constitution') on the common law of Australia? 1 In Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2 a unanimous High Court stated:
Of necessity, the common law must conform with the Constitution. The development of the common law in Australia cannot run counter to constitutional imperatives. The common law and the requirements of the Constitution cannot be at odds. 3 Applying this principle, 4 Lange developed the common law of defamation consistently with the implied freedom of political communication. Subsequently, in John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson, 5 the High Court held that the common law of choice of law in tort 'should be developed to take into account various matters arising from the Australian constitutional text and structure.' 6 Lange and Pfeiffer raise a number of interesting questions about the relationship between the Constitution and the common law. In particular, it is unclear whether there _____________________________________________________________________________________ * LLB (Hons), BA (UWA). I would like to thank Jim Thomson for his advice, observations and assistance. Thanks are also due to Robert Meadows QC, Joshua Thomson, Rossana Panetta, Jamie Edelman, Grant Donaldson and the referee for their helpful comments and suggestions. 1 In this article 'common law' refers to judge-made law and includes equitable principles. In
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 199 ('ABC v
Lenah Game Meats'), Kirby J considered equitable principles must conform to the Constitution: ibid 280 [192] . Other members of the Court found it unnecessary to consider this issue. 2 (1997) 189 CLR 520 ('Lange'). 3 Ibid 566 (footnote omitted). 4 The phrase 'the Lange principle' will be used to refer to the holding in Lange that the common law must conform to the Constitution. Although Lange stated that the common law must conform 'with' the Constitution, the use of 'to' is grammatically correct and does not alter the legal effect of the phrase. See, eg, ABC v Lenah Game Meats (2002) 208 CLR 199, 219 [20] (Gleeson CJ).
Without the continued existence of a right of appeal from the Supreme Court of each State to the High Court, it would be difficult, indeed probably impossible, to have the unified system of common law that the Constitution intended should govern the people of Australia. 27 Lipohar's joint judgment explained the importance of s 73 of the Constitution in the context of an understanding of the doctrine of precedent's 'central place' within the common law in Australia. 28 Interestingly, there are also indications in Kable that a common law of Australia could have existed before 1986. However, a different factor 31 In both cases, the plaintiffs were parliamentarians who commenced defamation proceedings in respect of publications that concerned their conduct in public office. Thus, Theophanous and Stephens presented the Court with an opportunity to consider a question raised by the Court's earlier recognition of the constitutional freedom of political communication: 32 could an action for defamation be sustained in view of this freedom?
A four to three majority decided each case. 33 In Theophanous, the joint judgment held that '[i]f the Constitution … is at variance with a doctrine of the common law, the latter must yield to the former.' 34 Viewing the common law of qualified privilege 'in the light' of the constitutional implied freedom of communication, 35 their Honours found that the law of defamation would not apply to impose liability in respect of a publication protected by the implied freedom. Therefore, scholars view the joint judgment as formulating a 'constitutional defence' to defamation actions. 36 The defence operated where the defamatory matter constituted communication within the scope of the freedom, the defendant was unaware of its falsity and the publication was not reckless or unreasonable. 37 Justice Deane joined in the orders made by the joint judgment to form a majority. However, his reasoning regarding the relationship between the implied freedom and common law differed from that of the joint judgment. 38 The latter considered that the common law must be taken to have adapted to the implied freedom in 1901. 39 In Thereby making it difficult to identify a ratio in Theophanous. 
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Volume 31 ____________________________________________________________________________________ contrast, Deane J argued that any assessment of inconsistency between the common law of defamation and the Constitution must take into account 'contemporary social and political circumstances and perceptions'. 40 Further, unlike the joint judgment, Deane J viewed the implied freedom's protection as absolute, in the sense that he would not have qualified the constitutional defence by making it subject to, for example, a 'reasonableness' requirement. 41 The Theophanous dissentients found it unnecessary to decide the questions concerning the Constitution's relationship with the common law. 42 However, Brennan J expressed the view that:
Although the Constitution prevails over the common law where there is inconsistency, there is no express inconsistency between the Constitution and those rules of the common law which govern the rights and liabilities of individuals inter se. That is because the Constitution deals not with the rights and liabilities of individuals inter se but with the structure and powers of organs of government, including powers to make laws which deal with those rights and liabilities. 43 Stephens further complicated the position. In Stephens, the defendant pleaded alternative defences based on the constitutional freedom of political communication and on an expanded common law defence of qualified privilege. 44 Chief Justice Mason, Toohey and Gaudron JJ maintained the position adopted in Theophanous, namely, that the implied freedom would afford a defence in certain circumstances. 45 However, it was held that the defence had not been properly pleaded in this case. 46 The joint judgment also held that the second defence was good in law. 47 Therefore, in principle at least, their Honours approved of both creating a constitutional defence and expanding the common law defence of qualified privilege. 48 For the purposes of Stephens, Deane J concurred with the joint judgment's answers to the questions posed by the case stated. 49 The minority judges held that both defences were bad in law. 50 However, it appears the minority left open the possibility that, with different factual circumstances, the common law defence of qualified privilege might be expanded. 51 Thus, immediately prior to Lange, there was considerable uncertainty about the relationship between the Constitution and the common law, or, indeed, if such a relationship existed.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
C
Lange's response: The common law must conform to the Constitution Lange concerned a defamation action commenced by the plaintiff, a former Prime Minister of New Zealand, in respect of a television broadcast by the defendant. The plaintiff alleged that the broadcast conveyed imputations including that he was guilty of abuse of public office and was unfit to hold public office. The defence reflected the uncertainty created by Theophanous and Stephens. For example, in addition to relying on a Theophanous constitutional defence, the defendant pleaded common law qualified privilege. 52 In this regard, the defendant contended that the implied freedom limited judicial power to create and define the common law. 53 Lange held that Theophanous and Stephens should be accepted as deciding that the implied freedom 'precluded an unqualified application in Australia of the English common law of defamation in so far as it continued to provide no defence for the mistaken publication of defamatory matter concerning government and political matters to a wide audience.' 54 Thus, Lange affirmed the existence of a relationship between the common law and the Constitution and accepted that the Constitution's requirements and the common law could not be inconsistent. 55 The holding that the common law cannot be inconsistent with the Constitution is not a controversial aspect of Lange. As recognised by Sexton, '[i]t has always been understood that the Constitution prevailed over the common law to the extent of inconsistency.' 56 Thus, as explained in Lipohar's joint judgment, the common law rule that forum courts 'do not assume or exercise jurisdiction to enforce the revenue laws of a foreign country does not apply within Australia.' 57 The rationale for the rulenotions of comity and territorial sovereignty-is inconsistent with Australia's federal structure. 58 The critical question arising from Theophanous was whether the Constitution directly intervened in the operation of the common law (for example, through the creation of a constitutional defence), or whether the inconsistency was to be resolved some other way. 
Federal Law Review
Volume 31 ____________________________________________________________________________________ Lange re-examined the question of how such inconsistency should be resolved. Approaching this question 'as a matter of principle and not of authority', 59 Lange took a different approach to the Theophanous majority. 60 Lange decided not to create a constitutional defence, 61 holding instead that the common law should be developed so that it did not 'run counter' to constitutional imperatives. 62 Interestingly, the Court did not expressly acknowledge its rejection of the Theophanous majority's approach. 63 Rather, the Court distinguished the Australian position from that of the United States, 64 where the freedom of speech guarantee in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution was held to create a 'constitutional privilege' against liability for defamation in certain circumstances. 65 Significantly, Lange's primary reason for adopting a different approach was the existence of an Australian common law:
In contrast to the position in the United States, the common law as it exists throughout the Australian States and Territories is not fragmented into different systems of jurisprudence, possessing different content and subject to different authoritative interpretations. 66 The relevance of this distinction has been criticised. 67 Even so, the High Court was correct to give it weight. 68 The United States Supreme Court has no general power to develop the common law. 69 Thus, the United States Supreme Court could not develop the common law of defamation to conform to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. 70 Implicit in Lange's rejection of the constitutional defence and its departure from the Theophanous approach is that the Constitution's application to the common law differs 71 Whereas an exercise of legislative or executive power will be invalid and have no application to the extent that it is inconsistent with the Constitution, the common law will develop so that it conforms to the Constitution. 72 For this reason, some scholars view Lange as denying the Constitution 'direct' application to the common law. 73 Lange does not expressly explain why the Constitution's application to the common law differs from its application to statute law or executive action. 74 Judicial decisions subsequent to Lange have not considered the basis for this distinction and scholars are sharply divided on the issue. 75
1
Basis of Lange's principle What was the Court's basis for holding that the common law must conform to the Constitution? In understanding the foundation of the Lange principle, the following judicial reasoning is critical:
The Constitution, the federal, State and territorial laws, and the common law in Australia together constitute the law of this country and form "one system of jurisprudence". Covering cl[ause] 5 of the Constitution renders the Constitution "binding on the courts, judges, and people of every State and of every part of the Commonwealth, notwithstanding anything in the laws of any State". Within that single system of jurisprudence, the basic law of the Constitution provides the authority for the enactment of valid statute law and may have effect on the content of the common law. 76 The concept of a unitary Australian legal system, with the Constitution forming the 'basic law', is essential to the Court's reasoning. 77 Within this system, it seems obvious that the common law (like statute law) cannot be inconsistent with the Constitution. Indeed, the Constitution's role within the Australian legal system was emphasised by Kirby J in Pfeiffer v Stevens, 78 who stated: '[i]n Australia, the legitimacy and authority of all law must ultimately be traced to, or be consistent with, the federal Constitution.' 79 Implicit in the Court's reasoning is a rejection of the view expressed by Brennan J in Theophanous that 'there is no express inconsistency between the Constitution and those rules of the common law governing the rights and liabilities of individuals inter se.' 80 _____________________________________________________________________________________ 71 See, eg, Stone, above n 36, 404; Sexton, above n 7, 18. On why the distinction is important, see Taylor, above n 7, 625-6; Tilbury, above n 41, 264-7. 75 Adrienne Stone and Greg Taylor take opposing positions on this issue. See, eg, Stone, above n 36, 406-17; Stone, above n 7; Taylor, above n 7.
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Volume 31 ____________________________________________________________________________________ On this view, the Constitution is directed to the 'structure and powers of organs of government' and 'does not purport to affect' the common law rights and liabilities of individuals. 81 However, Lange made clear that the Constitution 'may have effect' on the content of the common law, 82 including the common law rules governing the rights and liabilities of individuals inter se.
2
Scope of Lange's principle Lange's principle-that the common law must conform to the Constitution-is subject to an important limitation. In enunciating the central principle, the Court in Lange also stated: 'the common law in Australia cannot run counter to constitutional imperatives' and 'the common law and the requirements of the Constitution cannot be at odds.' 83 This suggests that the application of Lange's principle is limited to resolving inconsistencies between the common law and constitutional requirements. Justice Kirby reiterated this view in Lipohar:
In Lange, this Court emphasised that the common law in Australia may not contradict constitutional imperatives. If the provisions of a supposed common law rule are inconsistent with the Constitution, they must yield to the constitutional norm. 84 In Roberts v Bass, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ (in a joint judgment) stated that, if inconsistency existed between a common law rule and the Constitution, the common law rule 'would have to be developed to accord with the Constitution's requirements.' 85 Thus, the Lange principle has no application in the absence of inconsistency between the common law and constitutional 'principles' or 'matters'. Accordingly, unless a constitutional requirement is identified, and inconsistency exists between the common law and that requirement, the common law is not required (or mandated) to develop in any particular way. 86 Constitutional requirements are particularly important because a common law rule required by the Constitution is entrenched. 87 In Pfeiffer, the joint judgment explained that the result of constitutional entrenchment of a common law rule 'would be to restrict legislative power to abrogate or vary that common law rule.' 88 Thus, judicial entrenchment of the common law risks undermining the democratic process and should be approached with the utmost caution. 89 
D
Lange's approach to developing the common law to conform to the Constitution The judicial method Lange employed in developing the common law to conform to the Constitution has two characteristics. First, in determining the scope and operation of the constitutional requirement, the Court focused upon the Constitution's text and structure. Secondly, the Court gave particular attention to the identification of inconsistency between the common law and the requirements of the Constitution.
1
The scope and operation of the constitutional freedom of political communication It is important to consider Lange's approach to the scope and operation of the constitutional requirement of freedom of political communication. Obviously, casting the constitutional requirement in broad terms would increase the likelihood (and extent) of inconsistency between the common law of defamation and the Constitution.
The Court held that the freedom of political communication was to be articulated by strict reference to the Constitution's terms and structure. 90 Thus, the Court held that the implied freedom could not validly extend beyond what was necessary to give effect to the constitutional provisions that formed the basis of the implication. 93 However, some flexibility was given to the implied freedom. This was achieved by the Court's acceptance that ascertaining the implied freedom's content involved examining 'changing circumstances'. 94 Lange was an attempt to confirm the correctness of the 'text and structure' approach to constitutional interpretation in light of a more flexible approach previously adopted by several justices in Nationwide News, 95 ACTV 96 and Theophanous. 97 Generally, this flexible approach focused upon the overall constitutional structure and viewed the relevant provisions of the Constitution as predicating and being predicated upon underlying principles such as 'representative parliamentary democracy'. 98 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 90
Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 566-7. 
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Volume 31 ____________________________________________________________________________________ Despite the emphasis in Lange on constitutional text and structure, scholars such as Zines contend that Lange's legalistic focus was more a matter of tone than substance. 99 For example, Lange stated that 'the Constitution gives effect to the institution of "representative government" only to the extent that the text and structure of the Constitution establish it'. 100 However, as pointed out by Zines, the relevant constitutional provisions (ss 7, 24, 64 and 128) reveal little about the scope of 'representative government'. 101 It is not surprising, therefore, that the Court found it necessary to rely upon the work of a British scholar in its elaboration upon the content of the concept of representative government. 102 Notwithstanding criticism that Lange advocated a strict interpretive approach but actually adopted a less stringent method, it is contended that, in the context of developing the common law to conform to the Constitution, a strict approach to constitutional interpretation (such as the text and structure approach) is preferable.
As discussed, development of the common law to conform to constitutional requirements carries the possibility of entrenchment of the common law and undermining of the democratic process. Therefore, in this context it would be appropriate for the Court to adopt an extremely cautious approach to constitutional interpretation. An approach to constitutional interpretation focused upon the 'text and structure' of the Constitution restricts the scope for recognition of constitutional requirements and the 'reach' of such requirements. In turn, this reduces the potential for inconsistency between common law rules and constitutional requirements. As a result, the likelihood of common law entrenchment is also reduced. The need for a strict approach when dealing with constitutionally entrenched common law was recognised by Gummow J in Kruger v Commonwealth. 103 Referring to arguments that the Constitution adopted a general doctrine of legal equality, Gummow J stated:
[C]ontemporary development of the common law in Australia must conform to the Constitution … [b]ut in the absence of an anchor in the constitutional text it is a large step to extract from the whole corpus of the common law a 'general doctrine of legal equality' and treat it as constitutionally entrenched. 104 Thus, a strict approach to constitutional interpretation in the context of the Lange principle will limit the extent of common law entrenchment and prevent undue incursion by the judiciary into the legislative domain. 104 Ibid 154 (footnote omitted). It should be noted that the 'legal equality' argument referred to by Gummow J concerned the question of whether the Constitution itself assumes certain common law doctrines (such as legal equality). Sometimes referred to as 'the common law of the Constitution', this question is different from the question of whether the Constitution influences the development of the common law. ____________________________________________________________________________________ 2 Identification of inconsistency between the common law and constitutional requirements A further critical aspect of Lange's approach to developing the common law to conform to the Constitution was the identification of inconsistency or incompatibility between the common law of defamation and the constitutionally required freedom of political communication. 105 In order to determine whether the common law of defamation infringed the constitutional requirement of freedom of political communication, Lange applied the following test:
First, does the law effectively burden freedom of communication about government or political matters either in its terms, operation or effect? Second, if the law effectively burdens that freedom, is the law reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end the fulfilment of which is compatible with the maintenance of the [system of government prescribed by the Constitution]? 106 Lange answered the first question in the affirmative. 107 In relation to the second question, Lange concluded that, without the statutory defence of qualified privilege, 108 the common law would impose an undue burden on the implied freedom because it 'arguably provides no appropriate defence for a person who mistakenly but honestly publishes government or political matter to a large audience.' 109 Thus, Lange held that there should be an extended category of common law qualified privilege protecting a communication made to the public on a government or political matter. 110 The Court held that reasonableness of conduct was an element of this extended category of qualified privilege. 111 Moreover, the extended defence of qualified privilege would be defeated 'if the person defamed proves that the publication was actuated by common law malice to the extent that the elements of malice are not covered under the rubric of reasonableness. 113 Earlier in the judgment, the Court stated that the common law 'may' be developed 'in terms broader than those which conform to the constitutionally required freedom' but 'those terms cannot be any narrower.' 114 Thus, Lange appeared to suggest that the Constitution prescribes a minimum or base requirement for the common law of defamation. That is, the common law of defamation did not have to correspond precisely to the requirements of the constitutional implied freedom. 115 It should be noted that Lange's extension of common law qualified privilege differentiates Australian common law defamation from the rules of common law qualified privilege recognised elsewhere. 116 
II SECOND MODE: THE CONSTITUTION AS A GUIDE TO COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENT
The Constitution's influence on common law development is not limited to resolving inconsistency between the common law and constitutional requirements. Quite apart from the mandatory conformity of the common law to the Constitution, the Constitution may be used to guide common law development. 122 It is contended that, where the Constitution is used as a guide, its influence on the common law does not differ from that of an ordinary statute.
A
The Constitution may influence the common law in the absence of constitutional requirements As discussed, Lange stated that the common law could be developed more broadly than required by the Constitution. Importantly, Lange did not indicate whether the Constitution was relevant to common law development beyond that required by the Constitution or in the absence of constitutional requirements. 123 The answer to this question was to be found outside the context of the implied freedom of political communication in a case-Pfeiffer-concerning the common law choice of law rule for tort. 124 Briefly put, Pfeiffer concerned a workplace injury suffered in New South Wales by the respondent employee, a resident of the Australian Capital Territory. The appellant employer was registered in the ACT. The respondent sued his employer in the ACT Supreme Court. The issue was whether the applicable law for the assessment of damages was the law of NSW or the ACT. 125 The High Court unanimously held that NSW law must be applied. 126 In doing so, the Court created a new common law choice of law rule for Australian torts. 
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Volume 31 ____________________________________________________________________________________ element was the lex loci delicti (the law of the place where the alleged tort occurred). 128 The discussion below focuses upon the joint judgment of Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ. Justice Kirby delivered a separate judgment, as did Callinan J, who dissented on the question of whether a new choice of law rule should be developed. 129 Pfeiffer demonstrated that the Constitution's role is not limited to resolving inconsistencies between common law and constitutional requirements. Pfeiffer also suggests that 'constitutional principles may be used to develop the common law beyond that which is required' by the Constitution or in the absence of constitutional requirements. 130 The joint judgment held that the common law choice of law rule for tort 'should be developed to take into account various matters arising from the Australian constitutional text and structure.' 131 The joint judgment set out five of the 'constitutional matters' considered relevant to the development of the common law choice of law rule. These were:
•
[T]he existence and scope of federal jurisdiction, including the investment of state courts with federal jurisdiction pursuant to s 77(iii) of the Constitution;
• the position of this Court as the ultimate court of appeal, not only in respect of decisions made in the exercise of federal jurisdiction;
• the impact of ss 117 and 118 of the Constitution upon any so-called "public policy exception" to a choice of law rule for tort;
• the predominant territorial concern of the statutes of state and territory legislatures; and
• more generally, the nature of the federal compact. 132 Some of the language used in the joint judgment suggested that, in their Honours' view, the Constitution might mandate a particular choice of law rule. For example, the joint judgment stated 'the [constitutional] matters we have referred to require that a somewhat different approach be adopted with respect to Australian torts which involve an interstate element.' 133 However, their Honours went on to state:
The matters we have mentioned as arising from the constitutional text and structure may amount collectively to a particular constitutional imperative which dictates the common law choice of law rule which we favour. It may be that those matters operate constitutionally to entrench that rule, or aspects of it … If so, the result would be to restrict legislative power to abrogate or vary that common law rule. However, we leave these questions open. 134 For present purposes, it does not matter whether the High Court ultimately holds that the choice of law rule developed in Pfeiffer (or parts of it) is constitutionally entrenched. What is important is that the joint judgment considered the Constitution relevant to the development of the choice of law rule without holding that the Constitution required a In contrast, Dr Adrienne Stone initially appeared to reject the possibility that common law development might be guided, but not required, by the Constitution. 135 Stone contended: 'once it is accepted that constitutional matters influence the common law, development of the common law in line with those constitutional matters reflects constitutional requirements.' 136 However, Stone subsequently appears to have qualified her position, stating that the 'mandatory effect' relationship between the Constitution and the common law evident in Lange does not exclude the possibility that there will be some occasions where the Constitution 'has a weaker effect' on the common law. 137 The second mode of constitutional influence bears some similarity to the approach of the Canadian Supreme Court in Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto, 138 where it was held that the common law must be developed consistently with values enunciated in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 139 Similarly to Pfeiffer, the Canadian approach demonstrates the existence of a level of interaction between the Charter and the common law that is different to the question of whether a common law rule infringes a Charter right. 140 In RWDSU v Dolphin Delivery Ltd, 141 the Canadian Supreme Court held that the Charter only applied directly to the common law where the common law formed the basis of governmental action alleged to have infringed a right or freedom guaranteed under the Charter. 142 However, McIntyre J (on behalf of the court) expressed the view that:
I should make it clear, however, that this is a distinct issue from the question whether the judiciary ought to apply and develop the principles of the common law in a manner consistent with the fundamental values enshrined in the Constitution. The answer to this question must be in the affirmative. 143 In Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto, the Court described the influence of Charter values on the development of the common law in the following terms:
Charter values, framed in general terms, should be weighed against the principles which underlie the common law. The Charter values will then provide the guidelines for any modification to the common law which the court feels is necessary. 144 145 their Honours failed to clearly explain how each of these matters actually influenced the development of the choice of law rule.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Even so, the joint judgment evidently considered the constitutional factors to be important. 146 Their Honours primarily used the Constitution in the process of balancing the competing theoretical considerations in relation to each of the possible choice of law rules considered. 147 Thus, a theoretical consideration was stronger if it was consistent with the Constitution, or excluded if inconsistent. For example, the joint judgment considered the notion of 'sovereignty', viewed by European theorists as providing the foundation for the choice of the lex loci delicti, to be of little assistance in a federal system where 'sovereignty' is shared between the federal, state and territory 'law areas'. 148 Rather, federal considerations favoured a choice of law rule that proceeded from the premise that the predominant concern of state and territory legislatures is territorial. 149 Similarly, the joint judgment considered that, within a federal context, a court of one law area could not refuse to apply the law of another law area on the basis of public policy concerns-a principal consideration in favour of applying the lex fori (the law of the forum). 150 Accordingly, the joint judgment, although failing to clearly explain the role played by the relevant constitutional matters, was clearly focused upon ascertaining whether the Constitution favoured the adoption of a particular choice of law rule, rather than whether the Constitution required a particular result. 151 By leaving open the question of whether the relevant constitutional matters amounted to a constitutional imperative, 152 Pfeiffer demonstrated that the Constitution's influence on the common law was not limited to resolving inconsistency between the common law and constitutional requirements. 153 Thus, Bradley Selway QC (now Justice Selway) stated:
[T]he Constitution has a broader effect upon the common law than merely to abrogate it in cases of inconsistency. In addition the common law can and should be developed by the courts by reference to constitutional principles even where there is no repugnancy. 154 _____________________________________________________________________________________ 145 (2000) 203 CLR 503, 534 [67] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 146 Sexton, above n 7, 21-2. 147 The majority considered three possibilities -lex fori, lex loci delicti and proper law of the tort.
The Court also had to decide whether the resulting rule would be subject to a Selway's statement that the common law 'can and should' be developed by reference to constitutional principles in the absence of repugnancy raises an interesting question: is this mode of constitutional influence on the common law mandatory or discretionary? This issue, among others arising from Pfeiffer, is considered below.
B
How does the Constitution 'guide' the common law? It is contended that, absent a constitutional requirement, the Constitution's influence on the common law does not differ from that of an 'ordinary' statute. 155 Although scholars have identified a number of different ways in which the common law and statute interact, 156 the little attention given to this question by the High Court has focused upon the analogical use of statutes in the development of the common law. 157 Thus, the discussion below focuses upon this aspect of the interaction between common law and statute. 158
1
Analogical use of statutes in common law development Simply described, the analogical use of a statute involves a court drawing 'from [a statute] some principle to be applied by way of analogy in fashioning the common law.' 159 The use of statutes by analogy in common law development has a long history in England and the United States. 160 
150
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Volume 31 ____________________________________________________________________________________ particular field of law, development of the common law in that part of the same field which has been left to it ought to proceed upon a parallel rather than a diverging course. 161 Although the High Court appeared to reject the application of Lord Diplock's principle in Lamb v Cotogno 162 [T]he existence of such an action is inconsistent with the established limits of the traditional and statutory causes of action … Those limits … increasingly reflect what the responsible Parliament or Parliaments have determined to be the appropriate balance between competing claims and policies. Neither legal principle nor social utility requires or warrants the obliteration of that boundary. 166 Subsequently, the question was raised in Esso v FCT. 167 Esso v FCT considered the interaction between common law and statute in the context of the applicable test for determining whether legal professional privilege applies in relation to discovery and inspection of confidential written communications between lawyer and client. Sections 118 and 119 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) provided for a statutory test different from the accepted common law test in Australia. 168 The appellant contended that the common law, by analogy or derivation, should be treated as modified to accord with the statutory test 'at least in the jurisdictions where the [Evidence Act] applies'. 169 The appellant's contention was rejected on the facts. A majority of the Court emphasised that, unless there was a consistent pattern of legislative policy, to develop the common law by reference to local statutes would result in the 'fragmentation' of the common _____________________________________________________________________________________ 161 170 Thus, although the joint judgment did not expressly state its acceptance of the 'doctrine of analogy', it seems clear that a majority considered the doctrine could only be applied in the context of a consistent pattern of legislative policy. 171 Obviously, in contrast to common law development to conform to constitutional requirements, modification of the common law to reflect a consistent pattern of legislative policy is a matter of judicial choice. There is nothing 'requiring' courts to develop the common law to accord with legislative policy. Analogical use of a statute is simply one of several tools a judge may utilise in judicial decision-making. In contrast, Lange established that the common law and the requirements of the Constitution 'cannot be at odds'. 172 If a judge finds that inconsistency exists between the common law and a constitutional requirement, the common law must yield. In this context, the words of Gleeson CJ in ABC v Lenah Game Meats are germane:
[B]ecause the common law of Australia conforms to the Constitution, it has an important role in the formulation of common law principle. But it is not a mere balancing factor in a discretionary judgment as to the preferred outcome in a particular case, to be given such weight as to a court seems fit. 173 This leaves a crucial issue unresolved: what is the position in relation to the Constitution's influence on the common law in the absence of constitutional requirements?
2
Constitutional guidance vs analogical use of a statute It is contended that, absent constitutional requirements, the Constitution's influence on the common law does not differ from that of an ordinary statute. Three principal reasons are advanced in support of this proposition.
First, in both cases, the judge exercises judicial choice as to whether to take into account, and how much weight to give to, a particular factor in the development of the common law. It makes no difference that in one case the factor will be a constitutional 'matter' or 'value', whereas in the other case the factor will be 'the view of successive Parliaments' reflected in that statute or statutory provision.
Second, in both cases, the resulting common law remains 'common law'. When developing the common law consistently with the Constitution, the resulting common law is only 'constitutionalised' if the common law development is required by a constitutional imperative. 174 Absent a constitutional requirement, the resulting common law remains 'ordinary' common law, in the same way as common law 
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Third, the basis of the interaction in both cases is similarly directed to the 'intention' behind the legislative instrument. In the case of analogical use of statutes in common law development, the common law responds to the legislative intention. Indeed, the joint judgment in Esso v FCT refused to apply the 'doctrine of analogy' on the basis that '[w]hat has occurred in Australia in relation to the legislation here in question cannot be said to reflect a consistent legislative view of what the public interest demands in relation to the law of legal professional privilege.' 175 Similarly, common law development in accordance with constitutional 'matters' or 'values' can be viewed as a response to the intention of the Constitution's framers. It is a long established principle of Australian constitutional interpretation that the meaning of a constitutional term is the original meaning it had when enacted in 1900. 176 This principle is subject to exceptions. 177 For example, contemporary values can be, and are, taken into account in the interpretation of the Constitution. 178 However, although capable of responding to changing circumstances, the Constitution is read as reflecting its framers' intentions. If a judge takes into account, for example, 'federalism' as a constitutional matter in developing the common law, he or she would be responding to the framers' intention, as reflected in the Constitution, that the Commonwealth of Australia exist as a federation. 179 
C
Distinguishing between constitutional 'matters' and 'requirements' One of the most pressing issues arising out of Lange and Pfeiffer is how to distinguish a constitutional 'matter' or 'principle' from a constitutional 'requirement'. For example, there is disagreement about the extent that the common law rule developed in Lange is protected from legislative change. 180 However, Pfeiffer demonstrates more clearly the difficulties in drawing a line between constitutionally mandated common law development and common law development that is 'guided' by the Constitution. As recognised by Kirk, 'it may well be that what appears to be flexible common law is closely shaped by hard constitutional requirements'. 181 Of course, drawing the distinction is important because constitutionally required common law development will be entrenched, whereas common law development that has been 'influenced' by
2003
The Constitution's Influence on the Common Law 153 ____________________________________________________________________________________ the Constitution will be amenable to legislative change. 182 In this regard, Pfeiffer may be justifiably criticised for leaving open the question of whether the choice of law rule developed in Pfeiffer was entrenched, thus creating considerable uncertainty as to whether Commonwealth or state legislatures are free to legislate to alter that rule. 183 Moreover, are constitutional 'matters' or 'principles' to be determined by a more flexible approach to constitutional interpretation? Lange's strict approach to constitutional interpretation was not evident in Pfeiffer. In contrast to Lange, the Pfeiffer joint judgment focused upon broader concepts underlying the Constitution rather than being tied down to particular provisions. 184 Indeed, the joint judgment is marked by the absence of any real attempt to demonstrate the constitutional basis for the matters said to arise from the 'Australian constitutional text and structure' and deemed relevant to the development of the common law. 185 In principle, this is consistent with the differences in judicial technique between applying constitutional requirements and deriving constitutional norms. On the one hand, the text and structure approach is justified by the particularity of the rule created. On the other hand, the aim of deriving a constitutional objective is not to create a firm rule, but to supply a policy consideration for judicial evaluation.
Pfeiffer is not an isolated example of the Court's departure from Lange's textual approach. For example, in Sue v Hill, 186 the majority interpreted the Constitution in light of matters such as constitutional changes in the United Kingdom and changes in the relationship between the United Kingdom and Australia. 187 On a purely textual approach, it is unlikely that the majority could have reached its decision that the United Kingdom was a 'foreign power'. 188 However, the Pfeiffer joint judgment's approach to constitutional interpretation does raise the question whether a more flexible approach is warranted where the Constitution guides common law development rather than mandating it. Indeed, in discussing the Pfeiffer joint judgment's use of 'constitutional matters', Dr Greg Taylor states '[t]hese matters are not precise enough to justify a hard-and-fast [choice of law] rule. They do, however, justify an approach to moving the common law in one direction rather than another.' 189 In this context, an issue of concern is that drawing conclusions from broader concepts underlying the Constitution is a process that affords courts a considerable degree of latitude. This increases the scope for the development of constitutional law to be influenced by judges' subjective values. Accordingly, guiding principles are necessary to ensure that judicial legitimacy is not compromised. 190 Additionally, a more fluid judicial approach could result in the same constitutional 'matter' being used 190 See, eg, Gleeson, above n 89, 9-10.
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Volume 31 ____________________________________________________________________________________ to draw very different conclusions. For example, Stone has correctly observed that the concept of federalism, certainly a fundamental constitutional matter, points 'both to the unity of the Australian polity and to the independence of its constituent parts.' 191 A judge could draw upon either (or both) aspects of federalism in constructing a constitutional basis for an aspect of the common law. 192 Further, there may be 'false' references to constitutional objectives. Subsequent to Pfeiffer, the High Court in Regie National des Usines Renault SA v Zhang 193 considered the common law choice of law rule in the context of international torts-a question not examined in Pfeiffer. Zhang held that the choice of law rule developed in Pfeiffer, although developed in the intranational context, should be extended to cases where the locus delicti is a foreign law area. 194 In light of Zhang, it seems that Pfeiffer's result could have been achieved without the constitutional reasoning. 195 Arguably, therefore, the references to the Constitution in Pfeiffer were irrelevant and unnecessary. This is concerning, particularly given that the joint judgment left open the question of whether the choice of law rule developed in Pfeiffer was entrenched.
Accordingly, it would be useful if the High Court enunciated principles to assist courts in using the Constitution to guide the development of the common law. In this regard, a question of particular importance is the appropriate method of determining constitutional 'matters' or 'values'. Although the second mode of constitutional influence on the common law does not carry with it the possibility of constitutional entrenchment, the court's interpretive process should not stray too far beyond the text and structure of the Constitution itself. As stated by Kirby J in Kartinyeri v Commonwealth, 196 'judicial interpretation of the Constitution risks the loss of legitimacy if it shifts its ultimate focus of attention away from the text and structure of the document.' 197
III USING THE CONSTITUTION TO RESOLVE INTERSTATE STATUTORY CONFLICT
Not all areas of the common law will be affected by the Constitution and some areas of the common law are more likely to be influenced by the Constitution than other areas.
In the context of private law, Taylor suggests the Constitution's influence will be 'heightened' in common law areas that are of particular constitutional importance or when 'concentrations of private power approach the power of the state.' 198 example, those areas of the common law that may burden the implied freedom of political communication, such as defamation law or common law contempt. 199 In the public law context, areas that are likely to be influenced by the Constitution include administrative law (particularly the common law governing judicial review of administrative action 200 and natural justice), 201 the common law governing the liability of the Crown, 202 and the common law concerning the powers of and the relationship between the state and federal Parliaments. 203 This Part considers the possible use of the Constitution to resolve a particular problem concerning the relationship between state Parliaments-the resolution of conflicts between state statutes.
A
Interstate statutory conflict-the problem State legislatures have constitutional power to make laws that operate extraterritorially. 204 Section 2(1) of the Australia Act 1986 (UK) c 2 and of the Australia Act 1986 (Cth) grants to state Parliaments 'full power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of that state that have extra-territorial operation.' 205 In determining the validity of extraterritorial state legislation, Union Steamship v King adopted the test enunciated by Gibbs J in Pearce v Florenca: 206 [L]egislation should be held valid if there is any real connection-even a remote or general connexion-between the subject matter of the legislation and the state. _____________________________________________________________________________________ relationships, and common law rules of a public law nature or involving the criminal law, above n 7, 627. 199 In relation to common law contempt, Sexton refers to John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v AG
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Volume 31 ____________________________________________________________________________________ This broad nexus test increases the potential for conflict between the statutes of two (or more) states. 207 Such conflict arises in two ways. First, 'by reason of the direct operation of the law of one State in the territory of another'. 208 Second, where the laws of two or more states, 'by their terms or in their operation, affect the same persons, transactions or relationships.' 209 Yet despite the potential for such conflicts, its resolution remains unclear. 210 Conflicts between Commonwealth and state laws are resolved by s 109 of the Constitution. 211 However, there is no equivalent provision in relation to conflicts between state laws. 212 There has been no attempt to resolve the problem through legislation, whether by Commonwealth legislation or a Commonwealth-state joint scheme. 213 At common law, legislation is presumed not to have extraterritorial effect. 214 However, the presumption is rebuttable 215 and there exists no established common law rule to resolve any resulting conflict between state statutes. Although it has been suggested that the rules of private international law apply to resolve interstate
2003
The Constitution's Influence on the Common Law 157 ____________________________________________________________________________________ statutory conflicts, 216 the question has been given little judicial attention. This inattention is understandable given that it was previously thought that interstate statutory conflict could be resolved by 'confining each State to its own constitutional remit in terms of the territory committed to its law-making power'. 217 For these reasons, there is scope for development of a common law rule resolving conflicts between state legislation. It is contended that the Constitution favours, but does not require, the adoption of a 'predominant territorial nexus' common law rule to resolve interstate statutory conflicts. 218 Applying such a rule to conflict between two (or more) state statutes, the statute with the greatest territorial connection to the person, things or events upon which the legislation operated would be applicable. To the extent of inconsistency, the other statute(s) would be inapplicable.
B
A constitutional rule resolving interstate statutory conflict? In Breavington, 219 Deane J concluded that the Constitution itself resolved interstate statutory conflict:
[T]he constitutional solution of competition and inconsistency between purported laws of different States as part of the national law must, where the necessary nexus for prima facie validity exists, be found either in the territorial confinement of their application or, in the case of multi-State circumstances, in the determination of the predominant territorial nexus. That would have been the position under the provisions of the Constitution (in particular, ss.106, 107 and 108) even if those provisions had not included s.118. The presence of s.118 serves to make that position plain. 220 Thus, Deane J considered that there was a constitutional solution to interstate statutory conflict. Justice Deane's contention was primarily based upon ss 106 and 107 of the Constitution, which provide that, subject to the Constitution, the state Constitutions and the powers of the state Parliaments shall 'continue as at the establishment of the Commonwealth.' 221 At Federation, the legislative powers of the former colonies were understood as being 'fundamentally territorial in their content and operation.' 222 
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Volume 31 ____________________________________________________________________________________ according to Deane J, state legislative powers, although continued within 'the new national system', were viewed as remaining fundamentally territorial. 223 His Honour also pointed to the fact that s 108 of the Constitution provides that 'every law in force in a Colony' shall 'continue in force in the State'. 224 Justice Deane accepted that, subsequent to Federation, the High Court recognised the extraterritorial competence of state legislatures. 225 However, his Honour emphasised that this recognition could not alter the 'historical fact' that, at the time of the Constitution's framing, state legislative powers were understood to be strictly territorial. 226 For Deane J, the resolution of interstate statutory conflicts through the determination of the predominant territorial nexus was a result of understanding the background against which ss 106, 107 and 108 of the Constitution were framed. In Deane J's view, s 118 of the Constitution 'serves to make [ A point will indeed be reached in the legislation of one state having extraterritorial effect upon persons, events or things in another state, that will contradict the implied limitations on state legislative power inherent in the federal Constitution. 234 Similarly, Kirby J indicated that the Constitution itself would resolve conflicts between state statutes. 235 However, his Honour considered that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate either that the Victorian Act operated extraterritorially in an impermissible manner, or that any conflict existed between state laws. 236 Accordingly, the judgment does not articulate the nature or scope of the suggested implied constitutional limitation on extraterritorial state legislative power or attempt to formulate a constitutional rule resolving interstate statutory conflict. Justice Callinan also emphasised the importance of the Constitution, particularly s 118, 237 in answering whether 'the arms of one state should, in a federation, be permitted to reach into and pick the pockets of the jurisdiction of another.' 238 However, like Kirby J, Callinan J expressed no view as to how the question would be answered by the Constitution.
1
The Constitution does not mandate a rule resolving conflicts between state statutes This article takes an opposing position to that of Deane J in Breavington and Kirby J (and possibly Callinan J) in Mobil Oil v Victoria. It is contended that the Constitution does not require that interstate statutory conflicts be resolved through the application of any particular rule-including the determination of the predominant territorial nexus.
As stated above, 239 in the context of identifying constitutional requirements, it is appropriate to adopt a strict method of constitutional interpretation. Adopting such an approach, the Constitution's text is the principal focus. Moreover, implications from the structure of the Constitution may only be drawn when they are 'logically or practically necessary' for the integrity of the Constitution's structure. 240 Looking first to the express terms of the Constitution, as discussed, there is an absence of any provision directed to resolving interstate statutory conflict.
Nor can it be said that the Constitution necessarily implies the resolution of interstate statutory conflict in a particular way. In Breavington, Deane J suggested it was necessary to view the Constitution as imposing a territorial limit on state legislative powers in order to make sense of the fact that the Constitution continued the legislative powers and laws of the former colonies 'without express provision being made for the resolution of competition or inconsistency between them.' 241 However, it is entirely possible that the Constitution's framers intended that the High Court resolve such
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Volume 31 ____________________________________________________________________________________ conflict 242 without the assistance of an express constitutional provision-particularly in view of the inclusion of an express constitutional provision dealing with conflict between Commonwealth and state laws. 243 In considering whether the Constitution resolves interstate statutory conflict, particular consideration must be given to s 118 of the Constitution. Section 118 directs that '[f]ull faith and credit shall be given, throughout the Commonwealth to the laws, the public Acts and records, and the judicial proceedings of every State.' Can a rule resolving interstate statutory conflict be implied from s 118 of the Constitution?
The proper construction of s 118 has been the subject of considerable judicial and scholarly disagreement. 244 Section 118 was considered in Pfeiffer. 245 However, apart from stating that 'the terms of s 118 indicate that, as between themselves, the States are not foreign powers', the joint judgment considered it unnecessary to resolve other questions arising from s 118. 246 Thus, whether s 118 is relevant in the interstate conflict of law context remains unresolved. 247 It may well be correct to say that s 118 requires:
[T]hat the laws and "public Acts" of every State be given full faith and credit, in the sense of full effect, throughout the Commonwealth. In other words, all Australian courts are required to give full effect to all valid and applicable Australian laws. 248 On this construction, s 118 may entrench certain aspects of the common law. For example, as suggested by the joint judgment in Lipohar, s 118 of the Constitution might give a 'constitutional footing' to the common law doctrines of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict. 249 However, s 118 does not mandate a particular rule resolving interstate statutory conflicts. Although s 118 requires that 'effect be given to valid and
Volume 31 ____________________________________________________________________________________ Commonwealth', 259 Deane J considered that s 109 would not apply to resolve conflict between a state law and a law made by the Northern Territory Legislative Assembly. 260 In principle, such conflicts should be treated in the same manner as interstate conflicts, so that the state or territory statute having the predominant territorial nexus would prevail. 261 This view is consistent with the High Court's statement in Capital Duplicators Pty Ltd v Australian Capital Territory that s 122 should be interpreted in a manner 'which will treat the Constitution as one coherent instrument for the government of the federation'. 262 
3
The Constitution requires (but does not provide) a rule resolving interstate statutory conflict It has been contended that the terms and structure of the Constitution do not reveal a particular rule resolving interstate statutory conflict. However, a solution must be found. The Constitution was framed on the assumption of the rule of law. 263 The rule of law requires that a person cannot be subject to valid inconsistent laws. 264 In Breavington, Deane J stated:
[T]here lies at the heart of the legal system embodied in the Constitution acceptance of the principle that an individual should not be exposed to the injustice of being subjected to the requirements of contemporaneously valid but inconsistent laws. 265 Where such incompatibility arises, a court must find one of those laws to be inapplicable or invalid to the extent of the inconsistency. As stated by Kirby J in Lipohar, '[t]he integrated character of the Australian federation suggests that a ready means should exist for the resolution of questions about the law applicable within any constituent part of the Commonwealth.' 266 It is contended that the answer is to be found in the common law, using the guidance of the Constitution to develop a common law rule that is consistent with the Constitution, but not constitutionally mandated. However, an important difference should be noted. In contrast to an implied constitutional rule resolving interstate conflict, a common law rule guided by the Constitution will be amenable to Commonwealth or state legislative change.
